American University Washington College of Law
From the SelectedWorks of J. Jonas Anderson

2015

Applying Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
Restriction
Jonas Anderson

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/jonas_anderson/21/

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF
ENTERTAINMENT & TECHNOLOGY LAW
VOLUME 17

NUMBER 2

WINTER 2015

Applying Patent-Eligible Subject
Matter Restrictions
J. Jonas Anderson*
ABSTRACT

The US Supreme Court's difficulty in promulgating a standard
for patent-eligibilityhas not gone unnoticed in the academy. Hundreds
of academic conferences, including this one, have been devoted to the
topic. The goal of this Article is not to solve the seemingly intractable
problem of patent-eligibilitydoctrine. The goal of this Article is rather
more modest. Instead of normatively assessingpatent-eligible subject
matter doctrine, this Article seeks to identify which foundational
theories of patent-eligible subject matter can most readily be applied by
courts and the US Patent and Trademark Office via Section 101. In
doing so, this Article categorizes the various innovation theories that
scholars have applied to Section 101 and analyzes whether the
resulting doctrines can be predictably applied by the institutions
involved in patent law. Appreciating the applicabilityof patent-eligible
subject matter theories can assist the Supreme Court in shaping
doctrine that best achieves the policy goals underlying those theories.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"The concept of patentable subject matter under § 101 is not
'like a nose of wax which may be turned
. . ..

"

direction

and twisted in any

-

Justice Stevens in Parkerv. Flook (1978).

The US Supreme Court has long struggled to place meaningful
limits on patent law's scope. Virtually since the inception of the
patent system, there have been vigorous debates about which sorts of
innovations should be eligible for patent protection and which should
not. 2 Recently, the debate about patent-eligible subject matter has
intensified considerably.
Over the past three years, the Supreme
Court has ruled on four patent-eligibility cases. Those cases have
involved various technologies, from diagnostic methodS 3 to methods of

1.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51
(1886)).
2.
See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 2), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398696.
3.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1290 (2012)
(finding a process to help doctors treat patients with the correct dosage of thiopurine drugs to be
an unpatentable law of nature under Section 101).
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hedging risk. 4 Most recently, the Court decided Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank, a case involving the patent-eligibility of software.5
The Supreme Court's interest in, and difficulty with,
promulgating a consistent standard for determining which inventions
are patent-eligible has not gone unnoticed in the academy. Hundreds
of law review articles have analyzed the topic's doctrinal and
theoretical underpinnings. 6
Hundreds of academic conferences,
including this one, have been devoted to the topic.7 Academics and
industry leaders have written numerous amicus briefs to assist the
Supreme Court in defining the scope of patent-eligible subject matter.8
Yet the proper scope of patent-eligibility remains elusive.
The goal of this Article is not to solve the seemingly intractable
problem of patent-eligibility doctrine. The goal of this Article is more
modest. Instead of attempting to define the precise contours of
Section 101, this Article seeks to identify which of the diverse set of
proposed theories embodied by Section 101 are most workable for
courts and the US Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office).9 In
doing so, this Article categorizes the various innovation theories that
scholars have applied to Section 101 and analyzes whether the
resulting doctrines can be predictably applied by the institutions
involved in patent law.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to catalog the entire universe of
theories purporting to explain Section 101's role in the patent system.
Undaunted, however, this Article creates four rough categories of
4.
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 593 (2010) (finding a process to instruct sellers and
buyers how to hedge against price fluctuations of commodities in the energy market to be an
unpatentable abstract idea under Section 101).
5.
Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (finding
intermediated settlement to be an abstract idea, and its generic computer implementation
unpatentable under Section 101).
6.
See, e.g., Christopher Beauchamp, PatentingNature: A Problem of History, 16 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 257 (2013) (analyzing the "murky" theoretical and doctrinal origins of Section 101's
law of nature jurisprudence, and citing numerous law review articles throughout that discuss the
basis for Section 101).
7.
See, e.g., Symposium, Patentable Subject-Matter Eligibility Today: Software,
Genomics & Business Methods, AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF (2013), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edulsecle/founders/2013/20130412.cfm (representing a symposium held
specifically to discuss the current debate on Section 101 jurisprudence).
8.
See, e.g., Brief for Fifteen Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013
WL 432950 (describing the opinions of fifteen academics on the scope of patentable subject
matter); Brief for Amici Curiae Genentech, Inc. et al. in Support of Respondents, Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL
1098262 (representing the positions of six large pharmaceutical companies on Section 101 as it
relates to patenting isolated DNA).
9.
The federal agency that reviews patent applications and issues patents has changed
names several times throughout its 179-year history. The term "Patent Office" will be used
throughout this Article.
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patent-eligibility theories. First, scholars have suggested that Section
101 can promote innovation by rejecting patent applications that
would effectively "preempt" a field of research: "preemption theories."
Second, some have proposed that Section 101 can promote progress by
disallowing patents on whole categories of inventions that, in the
aggregate, impose costs on society that exceed the benefits from
patenting-"innovation harm theories." Third, other scholars have
suggested that Section 101 can promote the progress of science and
the useful arts by denying patentability to inventions that would have
been created even without the reward of a patent-"over-reward
theories." Fourth, a smaller group of scholars have suggested that
patent-eligibility doctrine is driven not by economic concerns, but by
more moralistic or ethical considerations-"non-economic theories."
This Article argues that of the four broad theoretical categories
identified herein, Section 101 is structurally best-equipped to realize
the goals of the innovation harm and the non-economic theories.
While difficulties certainly exist in doing so, the goals of both the
innovation harm and non-economic theorists can be roughly
implemented through subject-matter exclusions and are not
completely subsumed within other, more doctrinally rigorous areas of
patent law. Conversely, enforcement of preemption limitations via
Section 101 requires information about a patent's specific application
and scope-inquiries that are not easily achieved via Section 101's
categorical approach. Achieving the goals of the over-reward theorists
via Section 101 is similarly limited because of the fact-specific nature
of such an inquiry. Furthermore, preemption concerns are likely
better suited to another area of already existing patent doctrine:
written description.
Thus, this Article argues that the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit should avoid crafting Section 101 in an attempt to deal
with preemption or over-reward concerns. Instead, the doctrine will
be most effective if it is directed towards innovation-harm and
non-economic goals. Section 101 can, if properly calibrated, serve
some, but certainly not all, of the innovation-promoting goals of
scholars.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the Supreme Court's
recent foray into patent-eligible subject matter doctrine. Study of the
Court's decisions reveals a lack of a coherent theory for Section 101's
place within patent law and innovation promotion more generally.
Part III then analyzes judicial and academic theories for what role
Section 101 plays within the patent system. Part III creates a
taxonomy of four loose categories of Section 101 theories: preemption
theories, innovation-harm theories, over-reward theories, and
non-economic theories. Part IV concludes by suggesting that Section
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101 is structurally better suited to monitor innovation-harm and
non-economic concerns.
1I. THE ROAD TO ALICE CORP. V. CLS BANK
Whether computer-implemented inventions are patent-eligible
is a question that has vexed the Supreme Court for over forty years.1 0
In the early 1970s, corporations were beginning to appreciate the
value of software innovations. Large companies, like IBM, began
filing patent applications at the Patent Office that covered these new
advancements." In response, the Patent Office adopted a policy to
deny patents on computer-based patent applications. 12 The Supreme
Court reviewed this policy in a trilogy of cases in the late 1970s.13 In
doing so, the Court attempted to infuse coherence into the doctrine of
patent-eligible subject matter.
Instead, these three cases thrust
patent law into a state of confusion from which it struggles to extract
itself to this day.

A. The Trilogy: Benson, Flook & Diehr
In the late 1960s, applications for software patents began
arriving at the Patent Office. 14 Evaluating software patents proved
particularly difficult because many software claims were untethered
to physical restraints. 5
Unlike mechanical process claims, which
10.
See Lefstin, supra note 2, at 7-15 (detailing how the Court has spent years
wrangling over the patentability of computer-implemented process inventions, starting with the
1972 case, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)).
11.
See Timothy B. Lee, Will the Supreme Court Save Us from Software Patents?,WASH.
POST (Feb. 26, 2014, 1:13 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wpl2014102/26/
will-the-supreme-court-save-us-from-software-patents/
(describing IBM's computer method
patent applications in the late 1960s and 1970s).
12.
See id. (describing the Patent Office's rejection of IBM's computer method patent
application under Section 101 as an unpatentable mathematical formula); see also Examination
of Patent Applications on Computer Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 15,609, 15,610 (Oct. 22, 1968) ("The
basic principle to be applied is that computer programing per se, whether defined in the form of
process or apparatus, shall not be patentable.") (providing notice to industry from the Patent
Office that a computer program patent application is not patentable when it can be done by
pencil and paper).
13.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978);
Benson, 409 U.S. 63.
14.
See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad: An Historical Perspective on Software
Patents, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 191, 211, 214 (2005) (describing the history
behind the rise of software patents in the 1960s based on the exponential increase in the use of
increasingly faster computers, and highlighting that one of the earliest software patents granted
was to Martin Goetz in 1968 for a flow charting software called Autoflow).
15.
See Edward R. Hyde, Legal Protection of Computer Software, 59 CONN. B.J. 298,
302-03 (1985) (discussing how the Patent Office line of policy on rejecting computer software
patents in the 1960s was based on its struggle that software is "mental in character" and merely
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were at least limited by the physical output (for instance, cutting
sheet metal), early software claims were essentially claims to
algorithms performed on a computer. Such claims were generally
thought to run afoul of long-standing, albeit muddled, jurisprudence
forbidding patenting of processes involving steps that could be
performed mentally: the so-called "mental steps doctrine." 16
As software innovations began to reach the Patent Office, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the precursor to the
Federal Circuit, was tasked with applying the patent statute to this
new type of claim. In doing so, the CCPA developed a new approach to
the mental steps doctrine that permitted the patenting of software
claims. In its 1970 decision, In re Musgrave, the CCPA limited the
mental steps doctrine in such a way that it no longer policed Section
101 patentability questions. 17 Thus, after Musgrave, a patent could
not be rejected simply because the innovative process could be
performed mentally, or with the aid of a computer.
1. Gottschalk v. Benson
Two years after the CCPA's decision in Musgrave, the Supreme
Court began to grapple with the patentability of software in
Gottschalk v. Benson.18 Benson involved a method of converting
"binary-coded decimal numerals" (BCNs) into pure binary numbers.
BCNs are intermediate numerals used in methods of converting
conventional decimal numerals, zero through nine, to pure binary
numerals, the zeros and ones that computers employ in computations.
Benson's conversion method was simple and automatic, resulting in
reduced processing and reduced error. Benson's two independent
claims were both rejected at the Patent Office under the office's policy
of rejecting all patents on computer software. 19

a "tool of the mind" because it can be broken down into a series of mental steps that could be
performed by a person with pencil and paper).
16.
See id. at 302. Under the mental steps doctrine, "a patent will not be granted on a
method if an essential feature of the method consists of mental participation." Id. Its rationale
"appears to be that a mental step is non-technological and not part of the useful arts, but rather
an intellectual concept and not subject to exclusive use by a patent grant." Id.
17.
See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (limiting the use of the
mental steps doctrine to determinations of definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)).
18.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63.
19.
See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 686 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (reversing the Patent Office's
explicit rejection of independent claims 8 and 13 as unpatentable subject matter under Section
101 as part of its "blanket" policy to deny computer method claims), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 915
(1972), rev'd, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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The CCPA reversed, citing In re Musgrave for the proposition
that machine-implemented processes were patent-eligible. 2 0 The court
held that even though claim 13 did not limit itself to machine
implementation, "a process having no practical value other
in
than enhancing the internal operation of [a] machine[] is . .
the . . . useful arts[.]" 2 1
Much of the relatively short Benson opinion from the Supreme
Court simply quotes past Court rulings concerning process
patentability. 2 2 The opinion has been roundly criticized by both
commentators and lower courts as confusing, illogical, and poorly
reasoned. 23 Judge Rich of the CCPA followed Benson in a subsequent
case, but called the Supreme Court's reasoning "a mystery." 24 Indeed,
Judge Rich's confusion is understandable. The Supreme Court in
Benson sets out numerous, and at times conflicting, standards for
process patentability. 25
The Court does not explain why those
standards exist or from where they arise. The Court's opinion merely
provides examples of what subject matter is not patent-eligible.
The closest the Benson Court comes to providing a test for
patent-eligible subject matter occurs when the Court states that
"[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or
thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not
include particular machines." 26 The word "clue" leaves uncertain the
Court's true holding however, and indeed the Court later backs away
from this standard: "We do not hold that no process patent could ever
qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents."27
In reversing the CCPA and invalidating Benson's patent, the Supreme
Court cast doubt on the future of software patentability generally,

20.
See id. (citing la re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, alongside three other computer method
cases).
21.
Id. at 688.
22.
1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[61 [c] n.286 (2013) (listing previous
Court cases regarding process patentability cited by the Benson Court).
23.
See, e.g., Donald R. Dunner et al., Nonstatutory Subject Matter, 14 JURIMETRICS J.
112 (1973); Michael A. Duggan, Patents on Programs? The Supreme Court Says No, 13
JURIMETRICS J. 135 (1973). Judge Rich, then Chief Judge of the CCPA, openly criticized the
Benson decision in opinions. See, e.g., In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(Rich, J., concurring).
24.
Christensen, 478 F.2d at 1396 (Rich., J., concurring).
25.
Lefstin, supra note 2, at 7 ("Benson invoked multiple rationales for unpatentability
without definitively committing to any of them.").
26.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 70 (emphasis added) (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780,
788 (1896)). The Federal Circuit would pick up on Benson's non-definition nearly thirty years
later in the case that reignited the Supreme Court's interest in the topic. See In re Bilski, 545
F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 556 U.S. 1268 (2009), aff'd, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
27.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
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suggesting that only Congress could protect such technology by
amending the patent statute.
In the wake of the Benson decision, the CCPA and the Patent
Office struggled to implement the case's confusing holding. 28 For all of
its many limitations, the Benson holding does succeed in clearly
stating that algorithms, laws of nature, and mathematical formulas
were not eligible for patent protection, and both the courts and the
Patent Office latched on to this statement in an effort to guide the
patenting of software. Software innovators, however, adjusted to the
new limitations by drafting their claims in a more concrete fashion.
Instead of drafting their software claims as processes, they began
drafting them as machines-computers with the capability of
performing the steps that the software was designed to implement.
The CCPA found that such claiming practices met the limitations of
Section 101.29
2. Parker v. Flook
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Parker v. Flook to
address the issue of software claimed as a machine. 30 Flook's patent
application covered a method for updating the value of an alarm limit.
The limit was based upon a variable involved in the process of
catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. The method consisted
of three steps: first, measuring the value of the variable; second, using
the algorithm to calculate an updated alarm limit; and third,
adjusting the alarm limit to the newly calculated value. The patent
office had initially rejected the patent, citing Benson.3 1 But the CCPA
reversed, distinguishing Benson by noting that the applicant claimed
more than merely an algorithm.
In the eyes of the CCPA, the

28.
A number of patent-eligible subject matter cases arose after Benson and before
Flook, many of which were accompanied by strong dissents and concurrences. See, e.g., In re
Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (reversing rejection of method claims for improving the
efficiency of digital computers running multiple programs simultaneously); In re Noll, 545 F.2d
141 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (reversing rejection of a system and apparatus claim for the display of text
on a cathode ray tube); In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (reversing a rejection of
apparatus claims covering a record-keeping machine); In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392
(affirming rejection of claims to gathering data on subsurface formation and then computing
porosity information).
29.
See In re Johnston, 502 F.2d at 771 (reversing the Patent Office's rejection of a
patent application on a computer that could perform certain automatic financial record keeping,
in large part because the claims were directed to an apparatus-a computer-and not an

algorithmic process). But see id. at 773 (Rich, J., dissenting) (finding that the form of claim
drafting should not determine the patentability of an invention).
30.
See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1978).
31.
Id. at 587.
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additional "post-solution activity"-updating the alarm limit-was
sufficient to render the application patent-eligible. 3 2
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "post-solution
activity"
did not render
otherwise
unpatentable
algorithms
patentable. 33 The Court recognized that claim drafters had adapted to
Benson's limits on patenting of non-physical methods by attaching
software and other claims to some physical component: "A competent
draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity to almost
any mathematical formula." 34 In order to avoid exalting form over
substance, the Supreme Court crafted a rule that would consider
"algorithms" as prior art, regardless of the novelty of the algorithm
itself. 35

Flook provided a clarification and extension of Benson and was
certainly more clearly reasoned. However, the opinion muddied the
distinction between the subject-matter eligibility inquiry (Section 101
of the Patent Act) from the previously distinct inquiries into novelty
and obviousness (Sections 102 and 103).
Under Flook, the
patent-eligibility inquiry turned on questions of the inventiveness of
combining
an
algorithm
with
post-solution
activity-such
inventiveness inquiries have traditionally been the purview of
Sections 102 and 103 of the patent statute. 36
3. Diamond v. Diehr
Finally, in 1980, the Supreme Court examined software
patent-eligibility for what would prove to be the last time in nearly
thirty years. Diamond v. Diehr involved a patent application for an
improved method of operating a molding press for rubber
manufacture. 37 Prior to Diehr's invention, the Arrhenius equation 38
was used to calculate the cure time for rubber articles.
Diehr's
method involved repeated temperature measurements and repeated
calculations of the Arrhenius equation based on these measurements,
as well as automatic opening of the press once the cure time was

32.
See id.
See id. at 590.
33.
Id.
34.
See id. at 590-91.
35.
36.
See Flook, 437 U.S. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
37.
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
38.
In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 983-84 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (describing the applicability
Arrhenius equation for reacting time during the curing process as In v = CZ + x, where v
total required cure time, C is the activation constant based upon the batch of material
cured, Z is the temperature in the mold, and x is a constant based on the measurements
mold), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 926 (1980), aff'd, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).

of the
is the
to be
of the
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complete. Diehr claimed the general method, as well as the method
used with a digital computer. 39
In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that Diehr's invention
was patent-eligible. 4 0 "Industrial processes such as this are the types
which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our
patent laws." 41 Unlike the situation in Flook, the Court reasoned,
Diehr's application did not seek to foreclose all uses of an algorithm,
but rather was confined to a particular application of that algorithm. 42
Of course, Flook's application was also limited to an application
involving an alarm limit, as the dissent in Diehr effectively
demonstrates. 43 Thus, commentators have noted that it is quite
difficult to distinguish the facts in Diehrfrom those in Flook.44
Ultimately, Diehr, in combination with Flook and Benson, led
to confusion among lower courts and the Patent Office regarding the
patent-eligibility of software. 45 Following Diehr, patent attorneys
adapted by "claiming newly formulated mathematical equations
alongside some sort of physical manifestation."4 6 In light of the
ongoing confusion, courts adopted a simple presumption of
patent-eligibility following Diehr.47
Indeed, the Federal Circuit (the appellate court created in 1982
to handle patent appeals) modified its Section 101 jurisprudence at
various times over the following two decades, but ultimately settled on
broad patent-eligibility standards. 48 In its 1998 decision in State

.

In re Diehr, 602 F.2d at 985, 987 (evaluating claims 11 and 1, the general
39.
mathematical formula claim and the computer process claim respectively).
See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193.
40.
41.
Id. at 184.
42.
See id. at 187.
See id. at 209 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43.
44.
See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) ("Diehrseems difficult to distinguish from Flook."); Kevin
Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 349 (2007) ("Flook and Diehr are
difficult to reconcile.").
45.
The CCPA adopted a two-part test: (1) whether an algorithm was present in the
claims and, (2) if so, whether it is "applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps .
. ." In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905-907 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767
(C.C.P.A. 1980)).
46.
John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139,
1152 (1999).
47.
See Collins, supra note 44, at 349-50 (describing how Diehr led to the "default
presumption of a method being applied rather than abstract," in large part because Diehr
chronologically followed Flook).
48.
See Thomas, supra note 46, at 1153 ("Because general purpose computers could be
conceived as special purpose computers once instructed by software, virtually any fragment of
software code could be viewed as statutory subject matter."); see also John F. Duffy, Rules and
Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 612 (2009) (noting that
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Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., the
Federal Circuit held that any method that produced a "useful,
concrete, and tangible result" and met the other statutory
requirements for patentability could be patented. 49 The permissive
standard enunciated in State Street Bank led to a flood of software and
business method patents at the Patent Office.50
B. The Second Trilogy: Bilski, Mayo & CLS Bank
1. Bilski v. Kappos
After Diehr was decided in 1980, the Supreme Court took a
thirty-year hiatus from patent-eligibility cases. In 2010, the Court
renewed its interest in patent-eligibility by deciding Bilski v. Kappos,
a case involving a patent on a method for "managing. . . consumption
risk."51 The Court held that the patent was directed to non-eligible

abstract ideas. Reiterating its previous holdings in Benson, Flook, and
Diehr, the Court excluded three categories from the patent-eligible
subject matter inquiry: abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural
phenomenon. 52
The majority narrowly rejected the call to
categorically deny patents to "business methods," and limited the
Federal Circuit's recently developed "machine or transformation" test
to a "useful and important clue" in the eligibility analysis. 53
The majority's analysis in Bilski gives little insight into what
defines an unpatentable "abstract idea." The Court merely declared
that Bilski's claims were directed to an abstract idea without
explaining what distinguishes that idea from any other. Although the
patent in Bilski contained numerous dependent, narrower claims, the
Court found that those claims were simply examples of how to use the
unpatentable abstract idea. 54
Thus, Bilski reinvigorated Diehr,
essentially
overturning
thirty
years
of
Federal
Circuit

the Federal Circuit and the CCPA changed the legal rules of Section 101 patentable subject
matter a minimum of three times between 1979 and 2009).
49.
See State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
50.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (describing a
"legal tsunami" after State Street in which business method applications increased tenfold), cert.
granted, 556 U.S. 1268 (2009), aff'd, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter,
On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business
Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 730-31 (2006) ("[State Street] was quickly followed by a
dramatic increase in the number of applications for and grants of business method patents.").
51.
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 614-15 (2010).
52.
See id. at 609-10.
53.
See id. at 604-06.
See id. at 611.
54.
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experimentation with subject matter doctrine, while providing little
guidance about how to fill the doctrinal void.
2. Prometheus v. Mayo
Two years after deciding Bilski, the Supreme Court decided yet
another subject matter eligibility case: Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.5 5 The patent in Mayo was directed
towards a method of calibrating the dosage of a drug in a patient. The
patented method consisted of the steps: (1) "measuring" the levels of
6-Thioguanine in patients who had received a particular drug,
(2) "analyzing" whether the level fell within one of three ranges, and
(3) increasing, decreasing, or maintaining the dosage level based on
that analysis. 56
According to the Court, the relationship between metabolite
level and drug efficacy was simply a law of nature and therefore not
eligible for patent protection. Everything else contained in the patent,
i.e., taking measurements of blood levels, was nothing more than
"well-understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by
the scientific community."57 For the Court, that conventional scientific
activity was insufficient to transform the non-patentable law of nature
into a patent-eligible application.
The reasoning of the Mayo case focuses on the breadth of the
idea sought to be captured by the patent. Justice Breyer explained
that in order to patent an application of a law of nature, the patent
must "also contain other elements or a combination of elements,
sometimes referred to as an 'inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the natural law itself."5 8 This concern with preempting
the use of scientific information harkens back to the Court's decision
in Flook.59
3. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
In 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in yet another
patent-eligibility case: Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank. The patents at issue
in Alice relate to a computerized trading platform in which a third

132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
55.
See id. at 1295.
56.
Id. at 1298.
57.
Id. at 1294.
58.
See Lefstin, supra note 2, at 12 (noting Justice Breyer is harkening back to Flook by
59.
requiring an "inventive concept" beyond a mathematical equation to ensure patent-eligibility,
such that the invention in practice amounts to more than a monopoly of a law of nature).
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party is used to eliminate "settlement risk."6 0 The en banc Federal
Circuit held the claims covered non-eligible subject matter, but could
not agree on why. The only conclusion that received a majority was a
single paragraph of the per curiam opinion:
Upon consideration en banc, a majority of the court affirms the district court's holding
that the asserted method and computer-readable media claims are not directed to
eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.61

Six other opinions were issued by the ten-member panel: one
concurrence, two opinions that concurred in some aspects of the
decision and dissented from others, one partial dissent, one full
dissent, and "additional reflections" by former Chief Judge Rader.
Relying on its holding in Mayo, the Supreme Court reiterated
its two-part test for determining patent-eligibility. First, one must
determine whether the claims were directed to "patent-ineligible
concepts," such as abstract ideas or laws of nature. 62 Second, if the
claim is directed to such concepts, one must determine whether the
additional steps of the claim "transform the nature of the claim" into
patent-eligible subject matter. 63
The Alice framework and the
excluded concepts under Section 101 are largely driven by preemption
concerns. 64 For the Court, allowing patents covering the "basic tools of
scientific and technological work" would tend to impede the progress
of science.6 5
III. SECTION 101 AND INNOVATION

The
Supreme
Court's
patent-eligible
subject
matter
jurisprudence has proven difficult for courts to apply consistently. 66
As the Court noted in Bilski, a textualist reading of Section 101 would
permit "any" process that is new, non-obvious, and sufficiently
described to be eligible for patent protection. 67 Yet the Court has
looked beyond the statute, consistently holding that certain processes

60.
See CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd,
717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013), aff'd,
134 S. Ct. 2347.
Id.
61.
62.
See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
63.
See id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
64.
See id. at 2354.
65.
Id. (quoting Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2116 (2013)).
66.
See Thomas, supra note 46, at 1165 ("[A]rticulation of a useful typology between
technology and other aspects of human culture has proven exceptionally difficult."). Thomas
notes that distinguishing human engagement from the artificial has confounded "even
epistemologists and the most accomplished of technological observers." Id.
67.
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010).
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are outside of the scope of patent law. The current collection of
unpatentable subject matter-abstract ideas, laws of nature, and
natural phenomena-is difficult to define and thus exclude from
patenting.6 8 Part of that difficulty stems from the lack of a consistent
theoretical underpinning for the doctrine. Numerous commentators
have lamented the lack of purposeful theoretical guidance on Section
101's policy objectives.6 9
Before delving into the literature on the theoretical foundations
of patent-eligibility jurisprudence, it should be noted that some
commentators-and judges for that matter-dismiss the notion that
Section 101 serves any independent function. For instance, Michael
Risch has argued that the rigorous application of patent standards
such as obviousness, utility, novelty, and written description will
invalidate any claim that would be unpatentable under Section 101.0
In Risch's view, the subject matter inquiry serves no unique role in
separating good patents from bad, and therefore should be
abandoned.7 1 Scott Kieff has made a similar argument based on
economic principles.
Kieff views Section 101 as an economically
unjustifiable administrative hurdle for the Patent Office, requiring
hundreds of examiner man-hours with very little benefit for the
innovation system. 72 Indeed, even a former Chief Judge of the Federal
Circuit expressed the view that Section 101 is merely a "coarse
eligibility filter." 7 3 In former Chief Judge Rader's view, "[t]he plain
language of the statute provides that any new, non-obvious, and fully
disclosed technical advance is eligible for protection." 74
See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 134 (2006)
68.
("[T]he category of non-patentable '[p]henomena of nature,' like the categories of 'mental
processes,' and 'abstract intellectual concepts,' is not easy to define."); see also Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) ("The line between a patentable 'process' and an unpatentable
'principle' is not always clear.").
69.
See, e.g., Bernard Chao, ModeratingMayo, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 423 (2012); Dennis
Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine
Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673 (2010); Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz,
Clues for Determining Whether Business Methods and Service Innovations Are Unpatentable
Abstract Ideas, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 109 (2011).
70.
See Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 591 (2008)
(arguing for "rigorous patentability" to replace the focus on subject matter eligibility); see also
Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1092
(2007) (arguing software should be subject to the same "pro forma" requirements for subject
matter eligibility as other inventions).
71.
See Risch, supra note 70, at 594-95.
72.
See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 107-08 (2003).
73.
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting
Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010)), vacated,
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014).
74.
Id.
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The majority of scholars, however, suggest that Section 101
plays some independent role in patent-eligibility-some subset of
patent applications that are otherwise novel, non-obvious, and fully
described are nevertheless ineligible for patenting under Section
101.75 For the sake of this Article's applicability analysis, such an
assumption is necessary; thus this Article will follow the suggestion of
most scholars that Section 101 plays an independent filtering role in
the patent system.
Academic disputes about patent-eligible subject matter usually
revolve around what sorts of otherwise eligible applications should be
rejected.7 6 Unfortunately, no consensus exists for the theoretical value
of the doctrine. This lack of a coherent policy narrative for Section 101
is at the heart of the confused jurisprudence surrounding patentable
subject matter.
While there is no consensus regarding the proper role of
Section 101, there is general agreement, though not unanimity, among
towards
the
directed
doctrine
is
that
the
scholars
innovation-promoting goals outlined in the Constitution: "[T]o promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."17 Of course the extent to
which a single patent promotes innovation is an extremely complex
inquiry.7 8 This empirical gap, however, has not discouraged courts
and commentators from looking to Section 101 to further the
innovative agenda.
In spite of the wealth of Section 101 literature, significantly
less
work
has
been
directed
towards
identifying
which
innovation-promotion theories are best administered through Section
101.79 This Part begins to fill that gap by reviewing the literature on
75.
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection
for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1033-34
(1990) (arguing that the extent of patentable subject matter should not be read to overlap with
the broad meaning of the term "process").
76.
As Rob Merges has noted, "no ...
consensus on what patents are meant to protect
exists today." Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 586
(1999).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
77.
78.
See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855, 878 n.129 (2007) ("Put another way, no one is sufficiently wellinformed to know how to craft the patent eligibility requirement so as to maximize the surplus of
social benefits over social costs."); Duffy, supra note 48 at 618 ("[T]he ultimate policy judgmentthe extent to which the potentially positive effects of patents are outweighed by their potentially
negative effects-has long been recognized as unknown given the current state of human
knowledge.").
79.
See Kevin Emerson Collins, Claims to Information Qua Information and a
Structural Theory of Section 101, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 11, 22-23 (2008) (noting
that many theories of Section 101 lack "narrative and policy coherence that serves as a
breakwater to prevent the further erosion of the doctrine of subject matter patentability").
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Section 101 and creating a loose grouping of four innovation theories
from that literature: preemption theories, innovation-harm theories,
over-reward theories, and non-economic theories.
A.

Category One: Preemption Theories

The first category of patent-eligible subject matter theories
that courts and scholars have identified are preemption theories. The
basic concern of preemption theorists is that granting overbroad
patents or patents that cover fundamental discoveries will severely
restrict follow-up innovation. Section 101, the argument goes, should
eliminate patent-protection for innovations that would impede
progress
by
propertizing
fundamental
scientific
principles.
Preemption language is often employed by courts striking down
patents on Section 101 grounds.
The Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence has been largely
shaped by preemption rationales. For instance, in Mayo, the Court
expressed concern that permitting a patent on a diagnostic procedure
would result in a patent on the relationship between metabolite levels
and drug efficacy. Justice Breyer wrote that patents must be directed
to "significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself."8 0
This concern with the patenting of laws of nature stretches back
through the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on patentable subject
In Bilski, for instance, the Court stated that upholding
matter.
Bilski's patent would "pre-empt use of this approach in all
fields . . ."81 Similarly, in Diehr, the Supreme Court permitted a
patent on a method of curing rubber using the Arrhenius equation
because it did not "pre-empt use of that equation." 82
Preemption theories also inform the Court's concern with
patents covering "basic tools of scientific research." If such tools are
patentable, it is argued innovation will be harmed because that basic
tool is removed from the public domain. Thus, basic research tools
should be preserved in the public domain for all to use. It is thought
that if such tools were to be patented, it would impede-not
promote-innovation because a fundamental tool for a wide variety of
research would be exclusively owned by a single entity. As the Court
stated in Alice, the jurisprudence on Section 101 has been driven by
preemption concerns. 83

80.
81.
82.
83.

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010).
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014).
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The Supreme Court has expressed concern over granting
patents on basic research tools when discussing the excluded "laws of
nature" category for patent-eligible subject matter.84 The argument
has a compelling narrative heft because in no other patent doctrine is
there concern for the degree of fundamentality of the invention. If
policy makers are concerned with granting patents that may create a
bottleneck for further innovation,86 Section 101 provides a
superficially attractive policy lever to utilize.
Scholars, as well as courts, have suggested that Section 101
can be explained as a bar on patents that have too great of a scope.
For instance, Kevin Collins has argued that any invention in which
the information contained in the disclosure is the claimed invention
should be invalidated under Section 101.86 In other words, the
claiming and disclosing duality of the patent statute forecloses the
patenting of "information qua information" because the invention is
merely the information contained in the disclosure.87 One could not
simultaneously enjoy exclusive rights in the information as well as
disclose the information for public consumption. For Collins, Section
101 acts as the protector of the encroachment of the inventor's right to
exclude onto the access of the public.8 8
Collins acknowledges that the lack of a reliable taxonomy to
distinguish purely informational claims from allowable claims, which
are applications of information, undermines his structural reading of
Section 101.89 But Collins' work is a strong jumping-off point for
imbuing coherency into the policies behind Section 101. Collins
identifies Section 101 as the primary guardian of the distinction that
underlies the patent system's claim as an innovation producer. 90
Thus, while recognizing the difficulty of the endeavor, Collins' work
must be lauded for conceptualizing Section 101's unique role in
innovation policy.

84.
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
85.
Prospect theorists would argue that basic research patents are not something that
the patent system should seek to invalidate. Research patents will be licensed to those in
position to most efficiently take advantage of potential downstream developments. See, e.g.,
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266
(1977) (arguing that broad, "prospect" patents are socially beneficial because they encourage
coordination among technologists).
86.
See Collins, supra note 79, at 12-13.
87.
See id. at 24.
88.
See id.
See id. at 27.
89.
90.
See id. at 19-22.
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B. Category Two: Innovation-Harm Theories
A second category of theories infuses Section 101 with
This group of theories posits that certain
utilitarian concerns.
patents, or categories of patents, extract a public cost that exceeds the
public benefit that the patent provides. While similar to preemption
theories, innovation-harm is much broader. Instead of excluding only
foundational advances from patenting, as preemption theories would,
innovation-harm theories would deny a patent to any application that
would reduce social welfare.
Many theorists in this vein propose eliminating patents in
certain industries. Over twenty years ago, Pamela Samuelson argued
against software patenting, noting predictions "that patents may be
harmful to the software industry, computer science, mathematics, or
society as a whole have been quite frequent, even from some of the
most well-known people in the software and computer science fields."9 1
Jay Thomas has argued that patents in the liberal professions inhibit
"the ability of a profession to serve the public good." 92 Many scholars
have called for the end of business method patents. 9 3
James Bessen and Michael Meurer have empirically
demonstrated that software and business method patents have much
higher litigation rates than other types of patents. 94 They attribute
this problem, in part, to the "unclear boundaries" that they see as
typical of such patents.9 5 While Bessen and Meurer do not propose
that such litigation problems be addressed via Section 101, other
commentators building on Bessen and Meurer's work have proposed
precisely that.96
The reasons that commentators feel that Section 101 is the
proper policy lever to weed out the categories of patents that harm the
functioning of the patent system are not always clear. There is some

91.
92.
93.
TELECOMM.

Samuelson, supra note 75, at 1133.
Thomas, supra note 46, at 1176.
See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH.
& TECH. L. REV. 487 (2007).

94.
See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 150-55 (2008) (finding software patents

approximately twice as likely and business method patents approximately seven times as likely
to be litigated as other patents).
Id. at 187.
95.
96.
See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the
Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1819-25 (2007) [hereinafter Magliocca,
Blackberries]; Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry
Norms, 2009 BYU L. REV. 875, 891 (2009) [hereinafter Magliocca, Curve Ball] (arguing for a
modified Section 101 standard that "would be a positive reform because of the poor notice and
costly litigation now associated with these [business method] patents").

2015]

DIFFERING THEORIES OFINNOVATION

285

sense in the literature that the reason certain classes of methods are
litigation-prone is their abstract quality. Particular types of methods,
it is argued, have inherently vague boundaries and thus are more
easily infringed inadvertently or leveraged in licensing negotiations.9 7
Others point to the relatively low cost of innovation in certain
technologies that militates against granting patents on those
technologies. For instance, David Olson has proposed that patentable
subject matter doctrine be employed as a means of directly
evaluating the costs and benefits of individual patents.9 8 According to
Olson: "[T]he optimal solution may be to assign an administrative
agency the task of conducting explicit utilitarian analysis and
rulemaking in determining what types of innovation should be
patentable." 99

C. Category Three: Over-Reward Theories
Another flavor of the utilitarian foundation of Section 101
views patentable subject matter's role as policing the line between
those ideas that would be created without patent protection, and
would thus enter the public domain freely, from those that require a
patent in the first place to incentivize the investment into their
creation.100 Many theorists calling for restrictions on patent-eligible
subject matter argue that some patent-eligible inventions would have
been developed absent any patent system in the first place, and
therefore should not be rewarded with an exclusionary right. For
example, some have argued that business method innovations
flourished before patent protection, indicating that the current levels
of patent protection for business methods are unnecessary and
wasteful.101 The creation of novel business methods is thought to be
sufficiently incentivized by first-mover advantage, complementary

"

97.
See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 94, at 23 (noting that software patents are
more likely to have claim construction appealed, indicating a "fundamental uncertainty over the
boundaries of these patents"); Magliocca, Curve Ball, supra note 96, at 887-88 ("What makes
business method patents so litigation-prone is their abstract quality, which provides weak notice
for firms and increases the probability of inadvertent infringement.").
98.
See David Olson, Taking the UtilitarianBasis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case
for Restricting PatentableSubject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 200 (2009).
Id. at 185.
99.
100.
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 650 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("On one side
of the balance is whether a patent monopoly is necessary to 'motivate the innovation' ....
(quoting Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998))); J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions,
26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917 (2011).
101.
See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 264 (2000) (noting that frequent flier miles and
junk bonds are business innovations that were developed without patent protection).
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assets, and secrecy.1 02 Indeed, many of the calls to eliminate software
patents rely on the over-reward rationale. 103 The ultimate goal of
over-reward theorists is to identify those patents that would not have
been developed absent a patent system and reward those
patents-and only those patents-with an exclusive right to make,
use, and sell.
D. Category Four: Non-Economic Theories
While most of the writings on Section 101, from both courts
and commentators, have focused on the economics of patenting, a
smaller group has argued that non-economic rationales also play a
doctrinal role. Tun-Jen Chiang has described patentable subject
matter doctrine as being "often about non-economic moral values."1 04
Chiang theorizes that courts often use Section 101 to make
non-economic decisions, often based on things such as the dignity of
the human body, the inviolability of nature, and freedom of thought. 105
While Chiang's argument is largely descriptive, his argument is that
the courts are relying on non-economic rationales in deciding
patentable subject matter disputes. 106 Similarly, others have noted
that non-economic rationales have played prominent roles in recent
high-profile, patent-eligible subject matter disputes such as whether
genes are patent-eligible.1 0 7
IV. SECTION 101 AS AN INNOVATION PROMOTING MECHANISM

The previous Part attempted to categorize the various strands
of academic theories explaining patent-eligible subject matter
doctrine. This Part argues that the doctrine is better equipped to
carry the theoretical heft of some of those theories than it is others.
First, Section 101 is ill-suited to monitor preemption concerns because
102.
See id. at 275.
103.
See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 75, at 1136 ("The fact that [the software industry's]
growth has occurred without the aid of patent protection is powerful evidence that patent
protection is not necessary for the software industry to thrive.").
104.
Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, GEO. WASH. L.
REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2469415&download=yes.
See id. (manuscript at 17-28).
105.
106.
See id.
107.
See Jorge L. Contreras, Narrativesof Gene Patenting42-45 (Univ. of Utah Coll. of
Law,
Research
Paper
No.
90,
2014),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2485681 (describing the "access narrative" of the Myriad Genetics case);
see also Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in
Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 517-530 (2003) (describing the role of morality in
international patent-eligibility decisions).
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preemption theories require decision-makers to compare the scope of a
patent claim to the scope of a scientific principle-scope inquiries
that decision-makers are incapable of making.
Furthermore,
scope-of-rights concerns, like preemption, are more effectively
monitored by other doctrines, namely Section 112.
Section 101 is more likely to be an effective tool at policing
innovation-harm and over-reward theories, but only to the extent that
those concerns can be satisfied by categorical exclusions and not
case-by-case decisions.
Some strands of innovation-harm and
over-reward theories are premised on categorical exclusions: for
example, calls for the elimination of software, business method, and
other types of patents are common.
While difficulty remains in
making categorical distinctions, those sorts of distinctions could
conceivably be monitored by the Patent Office using subject-matter
eligibility doctrine.
Lastly, to the extent that non-economic theories are relevant to
patent-eligible subject matter doctrine, Section 101 represents a
useful tool for making relevant theoretical distinctions.
But the
doctrine's usefulness in this context may be limited to the courts.
Courts are more comfortable than government agencies (like the
Patent Office) in making moralistic distinctions.
Thus, moralistic
concerns can likely be effectively analyzed in litigation, but not during
examination.
A. Section 101 and Preemption
Virtually all preemption tests require decision-makers to
compare the scope of the patent claims to the scope of the scientific
principle behind the claims.
For instance, in Mayo, the Court
determined that the claims covering (1) administering a drug,
(2) determining the patient's level of T-G, and (3) making an inference
as to drug's efficacy based on predetermined metabolite ranges were
not sufficiently distinct from the natural law upon which the method
was based. Similarly, in Bilski, the Court found the patentee's claims
covering a method of hedging risk in the energy industry were so
broad as to capture the principle of risk hedging in all other fields.
Whatever the merits of a preemption theory-and there are
many-the theory is ill-suited to a threshold exclusion test like
patent-eligible subject matter. The Patent Office is ill-equipped to
properly determine the scope of the claims or the scope of the scientific
principle underlying the claims, both of which are necessary for
preemption tests. During examination, the Patent Office is concerned
exclusively with validity concerns. The agency does not interpret the
scope of the claims, other than to determine whether the claims cover
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prior art.108 Indeed, the Patent Office construes patent claims with
the "broadest, reasonable interpretation of the claims," a standard
that differs from the one applied by courts when enforcing a patent.1 09
Applying the broadest reasonable construction means that the Patent
Office never determines the actual scope of the patent. It is therefore
unable to compare claim scope for purposes of preemption.
Similarly, the Patent Office does not devote any resources
towards determining the scope of the scientific principles underlying a
patent. The office does not require patent applicants to identify the
principles that underlie a patent application, nor does it require
applicants to disclose non-claimed aspects of the scientific principle,
unless those unclaimed aspects consist of relevant prior art. Indeed,
making such an inquiry would require huge resources, requiring
examiners to not only understand and evaluate the new technology in
the patent, but also all other potential uses of the science behind the
technology.
For an office already under severe budget and time
constraints, devoting vast numbers of hours towards unclaimed
science seems like an inefficient allocation of resources.
Preemption theories are also a poor fit for Section 101 because
of confusion about the level of abstraction to be employed.
For
instance, in Bilski, the Court framed the patent claims as covering a
method of hedging risk. This claim was thus easily found to be
preemptive of risk hedging more broadly.
However, many of the
claims were much narrower than the Court's characterization. Some
limited the method to particular types of risk,11 0 others to
particular industries,"' and others still to the particular calculations
required to hedge.11 2 Had the Court framed the claim as hedging
weather-related risk in the energy industry by employing the formula
Fi + [(Ci + Ti + LDi) x (a + PE(Wi)] and performing a Monte Carlo
simulation across all transactions from a number of years of historical
weather patterns-as required in claim 7-it would seem much less
obvious that such a method preempts risk hedging generally. There is

108.
See John R. Thomas, Claim Re-construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the PostMarkman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 168 (2005) ("Absent unusual circumstances, [claim]
construction will take place many years-sometimes decades-after the claims were initially
submitted to the [Patent Office].").
109.
See generally, Dawn-Marie Brady & Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness
of the Patent Office's 'BroadestReasonable Interpretation'Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 285, 288-98
(2009) (describing the broadest reasonable interpretation standard and arguing that it conflicts
with judicial practice).
110.
Claim 7 involved weather-related price risk. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599
(2010).
111.
Claim 2 involved the energy industry. See id.
112.
Claim 4 expressed "the concept articulated in claim 1 into a simple mathematical
formula." See id.
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no test for properly abstracting a claim. This abstraction problem is
even more acute for characterizing the scientific principle at risk of
being preempted.
Lastly, to the extent that policy makers are concerned about
granting patents that are not commensurate with the achievement of
the inventor, those concerns are more properly channeled to another
section of the patent statute: Section 112. Section 112 requires that
patents fully enable one of skill in the art to practice the invention and
fully describe the claimed invention.
Furthermore, that section
requires claims to be clear and definite. While the Federal Circuit's
Section 112 jurisprudence has been roundly criticized as overly
narrow, there are numerous proposals to strengthen the doctrine and
to infuse Section 112 with the power to properly limit the scope of a
patent. 113 In contrast to Section 101, Section 112 involves a thorough
analysis of the relationship between the scope of the claims and extent
of the disclosure. Preemption-based Section 101 tests, on the other
hand, involve a comparison of claim scope to scientific knowledge.
Patent examiners and judges are much more capable of comparing a
patent's claims and disclosure than they are at analyzing the extent
that science has been preempted by a patented method.
B. Section 101 and Innovation-Harm Theories
Unlike preemption theories, innovation-harm theories do not
rely on scope comparisons between patent claims and science.
Instead, most proposals to infuse Section 101 with concerns about the
dynamic effects of granting patents suggest categorical exclusions
from patent-eligibility. 1 14 Such broad exclusions are easier for a
subject matter doctrine, like Section 101, to filter. The Patent Office
already assigns every patent to a technological art unit for
examination, thus the task of categorizing patents by technology is an
activity that already takes place at the Patent Office. Furthermore,
distinguishing patentable subject matter through a utilitarian lens
does not encounter the same abstraction problem that occurs with
preemption. Regardless of the specificity with which one views a
patent's claims, the technological industry remains relatively
constant.
Of course, categorical distinctions in Section 101 are not
without drawbacks. Making broad categorical exclusions based on
113.
See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, ForesightBias in Patent Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2397466&
download=yes.
114.
See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 94 (proposing elimination of business
method patents).
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utilitarian policies only works if one can define what technology a
patent covers.
This seemingly simple task can be maddeningly
complex.11 5 Business method inventions provide a good example of
this phenomenon.
While generally critical of business method
patents, commentators have yet to agree upon just what such patents
look like. 116 John Allison and Sterling Hunter have concluded that
"[a]ll attempts by courts and Congress to arrive at a workable
definition for business method patents have encountered intractable
difficulties." 17
Singling out software patents encounters many of the same
difficulties. Software patents are difficult to distinguish from patents
on computer hardware or systems. This is largely due to the ex ante
nature of any subject matter exclusion-attorneys know the rules
beforehand and draft their claims in a way to avoid Section 101
rejections. 118 Mark Lemley and Julie Cohen have described the former
practice of "magic word" claiming in the software industry. Under
that practice, "software was patentable subject matter, but only if the
applicant recited the magic words and pretended that she was
patenting something else entirely."11 9
But despite the limitations of categorical distinctions, it is
possible to make clear distinctions in many cases. For instance, a
categorical prohibition on tangible objects, like DNA, would likely be
enforceable. Similarly, John Thomas has argued that the "industrial
application" requirement found in Europe and Japan is a "concise,
proven" standard for eliminating problematic patent subject matter
categories, like software. 120
Michael Risch has argued that subject matter restrictions on
specific industries are likely fated to include subject matter not
intended to be precluded from patent protection. 12 1 Similarly, in his
Bilski opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that a categorical exclusion of

115.
Olson, supra note 98, at 61-63.
See Magliocca, Curve Ball, supra note 96, at 884.
116.
117.
Allison & Hunter, supra note 50, at 765; see also Dan L. Burk & Brett H.
McDonnell, Patents, Tax Shelters, and the Firm, 26 VA. TAX REV. 981, 1001-02 (2007) (arguing
that a business method exception would be futile because it could be evaded through claim
drafting).
John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18
118.
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 987, 1021 (2003) ("[T]reating different technologies differently places too
great a premium on ex ante definitions, such that the definitional scheme will be at least
partially defeated because of the significant transaction costs associated with attorney efforts to
opt into or out of a definition by carefully tailoring invention descriptions and patent claims.").
Cohen & Lemley, supra note 44, at 9.
119.
See Thomas, supra note 46, at 1178.
120.
See Risch, supra note 70, at 648 ("Like any bright line rule, fixed subject matter
121.
rules will lead to both over and under-allowance of bad or good patents respectively.").
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business method patents would inevitably eliminate patent protection
for some innovations that are in need of patent protection.1 2 2 While
undoubtedly true, the question that innovation-harm theorists would
ask is whether granting patents on an entire category of patents-as a
whole-would lead to increased or decreased innovation.
Thus,
concerns about whether an individual patent contributes to the
progress of science or not would be outside the scope of Section 101 for
such theorists. Instead, such questions would be left to the other
validity doctrines. Any bright-line rule will be a crude filter for
subject matter eligibility. 123 Despite this under- or over-inclusiveness,
such rules may be beneficial for promoting innovation broadly.
Some scholars have argued that the categorical elimination of
entire categories of patents is the only effective way to reduce
rent-seeking behavior, such as that exhibited by patent trolls. Gerard
Magliocca relies on the nineteenth century example of "patent
sharks," a group of businessmen that acquired patents on widely used
agricultural products, to support the imposition of unpatentability
rules by the technology sector. 124 He argues that the lesson of the
patent sharks is that "opportunistic litigation cannot be stemmed
through substantive changes in patent rights," and suggests that
abolition of business method and software patents "may be the only
solution for modern trolls."1 25 However, as Rob Merges points out,
other examples exist of the Supreme Court solving rent-seeking
problems with more "surgical" interventions.1 2 6
While Merges'
surgical option is clearly preferable, surgical interventions-like
preemption-are ill-suited to a sledge-hammer-like doctrine like
patent-eligibility.

122.
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607 (2010).
123.
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 94, at 244 ("Inevitably, any policy to restrict abstract
patents amounts to drawing a line between what is patentable and what is not, and,
unfortunately, such lines are drawn in the shifting sands of words. . . . We thus do not know
what it will take to appropriately restrict abstract patents in general or software patents in
particular."); Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual
Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 893 (2006) ("The courts have resisted using discretion to
sustain categorical exclusions from patentable subject matter, finding this to be too crude a
filter.").
124.
See Magliocca, Blackberries, supra note 96, at 1811.
125.
Id. at 1812-13.
126.
See Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1598
(2009) (describing the Supreme Court's "surgical" solution to the patent problem in the railroad
industry); Robert P. Merges, The Uninvited Guest: Patents on Wall Street, 88 FED. RES. BANK
ATLANTA ECON. REV. 1, 7-8 (2003) (describing the disruptive effect of patents in the nineteenth
century on the railroad industry).
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C. Section 101 and Over-Reward Theories
There is no consensus among over-reward theorists as to how
Section 101 should police the incentive structure of the patent system.
Individualized assessments of the incentives operating on individual
patentees are obviously impractical. Neither the Patent Office nor the
courts have sufficient resources to determine whether each alleged
invention would have been produced without the possibility of
patenting. Thus, Section 101 is incapable of furthering the goals of
over-reward theorists to the extent that those goals require
individualized assessment.
It is possible, however, to imagine over-reward goals operating
on a less granular level. Categorical exclusions could potentially
further these goals. For example, if it were determined that there
were sufficient incentives
to innovate-beyond
the patent
system-across an entire category of inventions, then categorical
exclusions would be possible for the same reasons mentioned in Part
IV.B. Courts and the Patent Office have the ability to distinguish
between subject matter categories, once those categories have been
identified.
D. Section 101 and Non-Economic Theories
The applicability of non-economic moral theories via Section
101 appears to be more appropriate at one level of patent enforcement
than another. Courts are accustomed to making moral, ethical, and
other non-economic distinctions. Thus, filtering patents by their
implication on such a non-utilitarian basis would seem to be a
workable, if unenviable, task for judges. Indeed, Tun-Jen Chiang has
argued that judges have done precisely that in handling recent
patentable subject matter cases.
On the other hand, such non-economic decisions are an
awkward fit for a governmental agency like the Patent Office. The
Patent Office is ill-equipped to make ethical and moral distinctions.
Furthermore, the agency's position within the executive branch means
that the standards by which the agency would review patents would
be subject to change with the change of administration.
V. CONCLUSION

John Duffy has suggested that patentable subject matter rules
"always fail" because of the dynamic nature of innovation. 127 Duffy
127.

Duffy, supra note 48, at 614.
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cites to the general models that predict standards to be more durable
than rules when faced with changing circumstances, a definitional
element of innovation. 128 The Supreme Court's uneasy history with
the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter supports Duffy's claim.
But, this Article argues the Supreme Court should consider
applicability when it modifies the standards for patent-eligibility
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In particular, Section 101 is more likely to be
successfully applied by courts and the Patent Office when seeking to
fulfill the goals of "innovation-harm" and "over-reward" theorists.
This is because both of these theories have strands that rely on
categorical exclusions.
Adjudging categorical exclusions is more
practicable for resource-limited institutions like the federal courts and
the Patent Office than other types of exclusionary tests that require
patent-scope-based inquiries. While far from perfect, subject matter
exclusions would be applicable by patent examiners and courts, and
understandable to those in the relevant industry.
Preemption
concerns, on the other hand, while laudable, are better-governed
through the doctrines of enablement and written description.

128.
See id.; see also Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 277 (1974) (noting the costs of altering rules to keep pace
with technological change).

